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Over the past fifteen years, the Rehnquist Court has sought to satisfy the politically 
moderate majority of Americans by engaging in a pragmatic and results-orientated “split-the-
difference” jurisprudence when deciding difficult constitutional questions.1 This approach, while 
 
* Associate, Lowenstein Sandler P.C.; J.D. with High Honors, Rutgers University School of Law 
– Camden. 
1 The term “split-the-difference” jurisprudence originates from a recently published Stanford 
Law Review article written by Circuit Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Rehnquist Court at 
Twilight: The Lures and Perils of Split-the-Difference Jurisprudence, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1969 
(2006).  Although this article makes use the phrase “split-the-difference” and the general 
principle encompassing it, this article is distinct in that it focuses exclusively on split-the-
difference jurisprudence as it applies to substantive due process doctrine.  In this respect, it not 
only illustrates the historical source of split-the-difference substantive due process jurisprudence, 
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seductive for its temperance and customary “evenhandedness,”2 can no longer serve as the basis 
for constitutional decisionmaking.  As illustrated by recent substantive due process case law, the 
Supreme Court has unjustifiably expanded judicial authority at the expense of legitimately 
exercised democratic judgment.  Under the leadership of Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., the 
Supreme Court must return to a process-orientated approach to constitutional law. 
The early years of the Rehnquist Court were often characterized as a period of 
“revivalism.”3 Chief Justice Rehnquist sought to restore a democratic balance in government by 
“reinvigorating … the authority of individual states to exercise their residual police powers” 
because he “seemed intent on recognizing the American Constitution as a document with 
enforceable structural features that would bolster this country’s enjoyment of democratic 
liberties and, ultimately, of personal rights.”4 However, due to the Chief Justice’s “ebbing 
influence and stamina” and a “growing faith in the powers of judicial wisdom,” this legacy began 
to shift.  Rather than promoting a limited institutional role, the latter years of the Rehnquist Court 
became increasingly synonymous with “judicial supremacy.”5 The source of this dramatic 
transformation was, in part, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.6 Her refusal to adopt a universal 
jurisprudence in favor of judicial pragmatism and her willingness to exploit a strategic position 
as the “swing vote”7 led to a “split-the-difference” jurisprudence, which greatly increased 
judicial discretion. 
 
it also suggests doctrinal solutions, which extend well-beyond the intended purpose of Judge 
Wilkinson originally published article. 
2 Id. at 1971. 
3 Id. at 1970. 
4 Id. at 1970. 
5 Id. at 1969. 
6 Id. at 1972. 
7 See generally MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 207 (describing how Justice O’Connor strategically deprived Chief 
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Split-the-difference jurisprudence materializes in two basic forms: result and reasoning.  
The Supreme Court splits-the-difference in result when “actual holdings straddle both sides of a 
difficult issue, and the outcomes, while perhaps unsatisfying to the adversaries in a polarized 
debate, nevertheless attempt to settle upon a constitutional middle ground.”8 The most recent 
and perhaps glaring example of this occurred during the last term of the Rehnquist Court.  In 
both Van Order v. Perry9 and McCreary County v. ACLU,10 the Court was confronted with the 
public display of the Ten Commandments on government property.  In the former case, the 
monument was donated to the state of Texas in 1961 by a civic fraternal organization and placed 
with other commemorative and historical markers and memorials.11 In the latter case, copies of 
the Ten Commandments were posted in the hallways of two Kentucky courthouses.12 Despite 
the similarity of these facts, the Supreme Court found by a 5-4 margin Van Order's Ten 
Commandments display constitutional, but affirmed a preliminary injunction requiring removal 
of McCreary County's display.  This result avoided a divisive and emotional Establishment 
Clause issue by attempting to secure a sensible, albeit ultimately unsatisfying solution, which 
avoided a universal constitutional pronouncement, grounded in the text, history and structure of 
the First Amendment. 
The Supreme Court splits-the-difference in its reasoning when it adopts a legal standard, 
which is based on compromise rather than an intellectually consistent doctrine.  In Vieth v. 
Jubelirer,13 the Court considered the constitutionality of state legislatures’ practice of politically 
 
Justice Rehnquist of a majority opinion in a pivotal abortion case by adopting a new 
constitutional standard after realizing that her vote would be decisive). 
8 Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 1972. 
9 Van Order v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005). 
10 McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). 
11 Van Order, 125 S. Ct. at 2858. 
12 McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. 2728. 
13 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
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gerrymandering congressional districts.  In the view of Justice Antonin G. Scalia, the issue was 
absolute: all political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable because there is no “judicially 
manageable criteria for adjudicating them.”14 By contrast, Stephen G. Breyer believed that the 
Court should adjudicate political gerrymandering claims and set forth a fact-intensive balancing 
test to determine when a political party’s power becomes too “entrenched.”15 Splitting-the-
difference between these two outermost positions was Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, because, by 
his measure, political gerrymandering claims should not be foreclosed per se.16 He appreciated 
the lack of neutral principles, which could present constitutional guidance, but nevertheless 
declined to take a definitive position given the importance of voting rights.17 Instead, absent 
meaningful guidance from the Supreme Court, he encouraged lower courts to develop standards 
for adjudicating such claims.18 Consequently, he expanded the scope of judicial discretion and 
inappropriately reserved a measure of institutional authority.  In contrast to the traditional 
standards of constitutional adjudication, Justice Kennedy simply made a decision with “an eye 
toward a middle ground.”19 
Although Justice O’Connor has since retired from the Court, and she, along with her 
colleague, Chief Justice Rehnquist have been replaced with “conservative” appointees Samuel A. 
Alito, Jr. and John G. Roberts, Jr., respectively, the temptation to implement a split-the-
difference jurisprudence remains ever-present.  As many observers have pointed out, Justice 
Kennedy has taken the place of Justice O’Connor as the Court’s swing vote, and “deliberately 
 
14 Id. at 281. 
15 Id. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
16 Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
17 Id. at 309-10. 
18 Id.
19 Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 1980. 
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and craftily” well-positioned himself as a “necessary but distinctive vote for a majority.”20 Thus, 
Justice Kennedy, by some accounts, now stands “alone in deciding the outcomes in the most 
divisive cases.”21 Yet, as Professor Douglas W. Kmiec notes, the appointment of Chief Justice 
Roberts may transform constitutional doctrine and stem the tide of difference-splitting 
jurisprudence.  In his first term as Chief Justice, Roberts has crafted an impressive measure of 
consensus and unanimity through his advocacy, pleasant demeanor and intellectual brilliance.22 
If the Chief Justice maintains this newborn influence, it could “overwhelm [Justice] Kennedy’s 
ability to deploy his swing vote” and provide the Supreme Court with a decisive opportunity to 
remake substantive due process while simultaneously finding common ground among strongly 
competing judicial philosophies. 
For the reasons provided herein, the Chief Justice must succeed in creating an intellectual 
environment suitable for adopting consistent, rules-based substantive due process doctrine that 
builds upon the uniformity enjoyed during the Roberts Court’s first term.  Beginning with a brief 
historical outline, this article will discuss the source of split-the-difference substantive due 
process jurisprudence by illustrating conflicting approaches made famous by Justices Hugo L. 
Black and John Marshall Harlan.  Then, by charting the approaches of selected current Supreme 
Court justices, it will shed light on modern difference-splitting substantive due process 
 
20 Dahlia Lithwick, Swing Time, SLATE (January 17, 2006), at www.slate.com/id/2134421/ (last 
visited August 7, 2006). 
21 David G. Savage, Déjà vu Once Again, ABA JOURNAL 13 (September 2006). 
22 Douglas W. Kmiec, Who Really Rules the Supreme Court?, Los Angeles Times (July 8, 2006), 
available at www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-
kmiec8jul08,0,1887126.story?coll=la-news-comment-opinions (last visited August 8, 2006) 
(Chief Justice Roberts “has a conservative mind but a diplomat’s nature”); Dahlia Lithwick, 
Charm Offensive, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (August 1, 2006), available at 
www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleFriendlyTAL.jsp?id=1153991132514 (last visited August 1, 
2006); see, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1297 
(2005) (unanimous opinion on contentious First Amendment issue implicating associational 
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jurisprudence.23 Finally, this article will suggest doctrinal mechanisms that will allow Chief 
Justice Roberts to eliminate split-the-difference jurisprudence and return the Supreme Court to 
its role as a limited, but nevertheless equally important, institutional authority.24 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
 
Substantive due process “is widely viewed as the most problematic category in 
constitutional law”25 and it has long been the subject of tremendous controversy from the period 
of the so-called Lochner Era to the contentious decisions of Roe v. Wade and Lawrence v. Texas.
speech).  But see, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. ___ (2006) (divisive 5-4 decision on the 
continued applicability of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule).  
23 Kmiec, supra note 22, available at www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-
kmiec8jul08,0,1887126.story?coll=la-news-comment-opinions (last visited August 8, 2006) 
(commenting that the four-vote liberal block lead by Justice John Paul Stevens is deadlocked 
with the rock-solid conservatives led by Justice Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas); see 
generally Laurence H. Tribe, Treatise Power, 8 Green Bag 2d 291, 292 (2005) (letter to 
Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer stating that constitutional law “could go in any of several 
directions”). 
24 “The case for split-the-difference jurisprudence is not an insubstantial one.”  Wilkinson, supra 
note 1, at 1981.  Split-the-difference leads to moderation, which “is a trait that the public admires 
in the judiciary” and it “permits the Court to stay above the fray and to assume a statemanlike 
pose.”  Id. at 1981-82.  But at the same token, split-the-difference jurisprudence also leads to an 
unwarranted increase is judicial authority, which infringes too greatly on the Congress, the 
executive and the States.  As Justice Scalia noted in Vieth,
"The judicial Power" created by Article III, § 1, of the Constitution is not 
whatever judges choose to do, see Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United 
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 487 (1982); cf. Grupo 
Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 332-
333 (1999), or even whatever Congress chooses to assign them, see Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-577 (1992); Chicago & S. Air Lines, 
Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 110-114 (1948).  It is the power to 
act in the manner traditional for English and American courts.  One of the most 
obvious limitations imposed by that requirement is that judicial action must be 
governed by standard, by rule. Laws promulgated by the Legislative Branch can 
be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law pronounced by the courts must be 
principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions. 
Id. at 278.  The purpose of this article, therefore, is too explain the source of split-the-difference 
substantive due process jurisprudence and suggest doctrinal mechanisms for overcoming the 
temptation to implement it. 
25 Richard H. Fallon, Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional 
Remedies, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 309, 314 (1993). 
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The doctrine originates from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which provide that neither the federal government nor the 
states, respectively, shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.”26 The early history of the Due Process Clause dates back to 1215 and the signing of 
Magna Carta, a document, which bound the King of England to guarantee certain procedural 
rights to all free men: “No free man shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized, or outlawed, or 
exiled, or any wise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by the 
lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”27 Although the drafters of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments replaced the phrase “law of the land” with “due process of law,” they 
did not remake or expand upon the intent of the Magna Carta.28 Instead, substantive protection 
under the Due Process Clause evolved as a matter of judicial interpretation and the Supreme 
Court’s increasing desire to supplement constitutional protections, which evaporated as a result 
of the Slaughter House Cases’ “liquidation”29 of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. 
A. The Lochner Era 
26 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.  The Fifth Amendment offers identical protection, which is 
applicable to the federal government. 
27 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (citing 9 Hen. 3, c. 29 (1225)) (Black, J., dissenting). 
28 Id. (citing Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 18 How. 272, 276 (1856) (“the 
words, ‘due process of law,’ were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the 
words ‘by the law of the land’ in the Magna Carta”)). 
29 Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges and Immunities Clause and Revising the 
Slaughter House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1996); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 760 
n. 6 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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The theory that the Due Process Clause contained substantive protections only became 
“serious”30 in the late 1890’s.  In Allgeyer v. Louisiana,31 the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of a Louisiana statute, which prohibited persons from contracting with marine 
insurance companies that had not complied with state law.32 The trial court entered a judgment 
in favor of defendants, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed.33 On appeal, the United States 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that Louisiana’s regulation of the contracts at issue violated the 
Due Process Clause’s protection of “liberty.”34 In dictum, the Court reasoned that the Due 
Process Clause embraces a right of citizens “to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be 
free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any 
lawful calling; [and] to pursue any livelihood or avocation . . . .”35 
Following Allgeyer, the Supreme Court elaborated on its broad mandate of freedom to 
enjoy “all faculties”36 in a case, which would eventually serve to infamously identify this time 
period of laissez faire jurisprudence.37 In Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court in a five-four 
decision declared unconstitutional a New York statute that set maximum hours for bakers at 10 
hours per day or 60 hours per week.38 Closely scrutinizing the legislation, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that it was “an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of 
the individual to . . . enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him 
 
30 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 760 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); see also Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (noting that substantive due process has existed since 
at least Mugler v. Kanasas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887)) (joint opinion). 
31 Allgeyer v. Lousisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
32 Id. at 593. 
33 Id. at 584-89. 
34 Id. at 589. 
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
38 Id. at 52. 
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appropriate or necessary.”39 Freedom of contract, the Court believed, is the general rule and 
restraint is the exception.40 In dissent, the first Justice John Marshall Harlan acknowledged the 
mandate prescribed in Allgeyer, but conceded that economic liberty is still subject to regulations, 
which may sometimes prohibit certain business practices.41 Charting a line of cases “so 
numerous that further citations are unnecessary,”42 he concluded that the regulation in question 
should properly be considered a lawful police power of New York State.43 Writing separately, 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. added that the Court’s current conception of “liberty” in the 
Fourteenth Amendment is “perverted when it is held to prevent” a regulation enacted through 
democratic means “unless it can be said that … the statute … would infringe [on] fundamental 
principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.”44 
As any first year constitutional law student can attest, by 1937 the Supreme Court’s 
Lochner Era protectionist mindset evaporated and the focus on economic liberty diminished.45 
Despite a strong willingness to question democratically enacted legislation and invalidate it as an 
arbitrary restraint on economic “liberty,” the Supreme Court's jurisprudence eventually succumb 
to outside pressures such as the Great Depression and shifted to adopt the deferential approach 
articulated in Lochner’s dissent.46 Substantive due process, “the earlier constitutional principle 
 
39 Id. at 56. 
40 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923). 
41 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 65-66 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
42 Id. at 67. 
43 See id. at 72 (stating that New York’s rationale for enacting the legislation “ought to be the 
end of th[e] case”). 
44 Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
45 See West Cost Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (signaling the demise of 
Lochner). 
46 Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-62. 
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that states have power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their 
internal commercial and business affairs,”47 was no longer supportable. 
B. Justice John M. Harlan and the Second Coming of Substantive Due Process 
 Subsequent to Lochner’s demise, substantive due process was thought to be a dead 
letter.48 But with the liberalization of constitutional doctrine in the 1960’s, which included an 
endorsement of a so-called “living Constitution”49 from the Warren Court, substantive due 
process was remade into a mechanism in which to question the reasonableness of social, rather 
than economic, legislation.  This constitutional rebirth became a convenient tool for invalidating 
statutes thought to intrude too prominently on the individual and personal decisions of American 
citizens.  As a result, state and federal legislation that infringes on deeply personal issues such as 
a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy;50 a married couple’s ability to use birth 
control;51 an extended family’s decision to live as one unit;52 or a patient’s right to refuse 
medical treatment,53 are treated as suspect and afforded a higher level of judicial review.  If a 
State seeks to regulate such issues, it is ordinarily required to first demonstrate that there exists a 
compelling governmental interest. 
 
47 Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949). 
48 Casey, 505 U.S. at 862 (citing ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
85 (1941)); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (stating that substantive 
due process was thought to be put to “rest once and for all”) (Black, J., dissenting). 
49 See e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
50 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
51 Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Griswold v. Conneticuct, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965). 
52 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
53 Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287-89 (1990) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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The intellectual source of the second coming of substantive due process owes itself to the 
second Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ulman.54 In Poe, the plaintiffs were 
doctors and patients challenging the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute prohibiting the use 
of contraceptive devices.55 The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut held that the statutes 
were applicable to married couples even under a claim that contraception would pose a serious 
threat to the health of a married woman.56 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the mere existence of the challenged statute did not afford standing to the plaintiffs.57 The State 
had not prosecuted anyone for violating the statute and the plaintiffs were in no danger of 
immediately sustaining any injury to its enforcement.58 
In dissent, Justice Harlan moved beyond the question of justiciability and addressed the 
merits of the plaintiffs’ challenge, which he concluded, violated the Due Process Clause’s 
guarantee against “arbitrary impositions … of purposeless restraints.”59 To arrive at this holding, 
Justice Harlan began his analysis with commentary on the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.60 Anticipating objections from his colleagues who would dispute any 
substantive component to the Due Process Clause, he acknowledged that its historical source, the 
Magna Carta, contemplated procedural safeguards “against executive usurpation and tyranny.”61 
Nevertheless, in a cursory and somewhat convenient fashion, he concluded that the history of the 
 
54 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 762 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that Justice Harlan’s 
dissent in Poe serves as a “major opinion leading to the modern doctrine”); id. at 765 (engaging 
in an analysis of unenumerated rights “in the wake of Poe”); see also Poe, 367 U.S. at 539 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (conceding that his approach to substantive due process does not find a 
basis in the “explicit language of the Constitution” or “in any decision” of the Supreme Court’s 
prior case law). 
55 Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958). 
56 Poe, 367 U.S. at 498. 
57 Id. at 508-09. 
58 Id. at 501. 
59 Id. at 543. 
60 Id. at 540-42. 
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Fourteenth Amendment “shed[] little light”62 on the meaning of the Due Process Clause. 
Therefore, as an original matter, the Due Process Clause was not necessarily confined to 
procedural guarantees.63 Buttressing this conclusion, Justice Harlan offered a pragmatic 
explanation for recognizing substantive due process rights.  The protection of procedural rights, 
but the denial of substantive rights would “fail to reach those situations where the deprivation of 
life, liberty or property was accomplished by legislation which by operating in the future could, 
given even the fairest possible procedure in application to individuals, nevertheless destroy the 
enjoyment of all three.”64 Stated another way, even where procedural rights were protected to 
the greatest extent possible, the denial of substantive rights would eventually lead to destruction 
of any entitlement to life, liberty or property.    
Even assuming Justice Harlan’s reading of the Due Process Clause is correct, there 
remains the considerable challenge of developing a methodology for determining what 
substantive protections are afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment.  In the case of procedural 
rights under the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has appropriately engaged in a 
balancing of interests.65 After all, the word “due” is not an absolute prescription, but a 
recognition that a safeguard must be afforded in proportion to the life, liberty or property at 
stake.66 Taken further, the Supreme Court has distilled procedural due process to notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.67 In the case of substantive due process, Justice Harlan advocated for a 
 
61 Id. at 540. 
62 Id. at 541 (citing Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 2
Stan. L. Rev. 15). 
63 See id. at 540-42. 
64 Id. 
65 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). 
66 See id.
67 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 57980 (1975). 
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similar balancing of interests because he believed that such rights could not be “reduced to any 
formula” or “determined by reference to any code.”68 
Despite an amorphous balancing of competing interests, Justice Harlan did not believe 
that “judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them;”69 or, stated in 
modern jargon, “legislate from the bench.”  On the contrary, judges can strike the proper balance 
of interests by “having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which … [this 
country] developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.”70 Moreover, judges can 
exercise “limited and sharply restrained judgment” and engage in the common law tradition of 
making a decision on novel claims by closely following “well-accepted principles and criteria.”71 
Quoting the Court’s language in Rochin v. California,72 Justice Harlan repeated that the “vague 
contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave judges at large” because they cannot merely 
draw on “personal and private notions and disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial 
function.”73 
While reason and restraint are well-accepted mechanisms for limiting judicial discretion, 
Justice Harlan’s reliance on “living” tradition74 as a guidepost is decidedly more problematic and 
has led in no small part to the Supreme Court’s current crisis of consistency.75 In Poe, Justice 
Harlan’s application of “living” tradition provided him with justification for reaching a benign 
 
68 Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
69 Id. at 542. 
70 Id.
71 Id. at 544. 
72 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
73 Id. at 170-71. 
74 Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
75 See John F. Basiak, Jr., Dangerous Predictions: Referencing “Emerging” History and 
Tradition in an Era of Blue State Federalism, 15 Widener L. J. 135, 136-37 (2005) (concluding 
that the utilization of “emerging” during a rise in Blue State Federalism creates a “dangerously 
predictive methodology” that “invites lower federal courts to seek constitutional guidance from 
recent social trends supported by powerful progressive states”).  
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and comfortable result: the invalidation of an “uncommonly silly”76 and “asinine”77 
contraception statute.  From a common sense perspective, the government’s interest in regulating 
a married couple’s access to contraception seems minimal; thus, the decision, at first blush, 
appears correct.  Yet, despite this pragmatic conclusion, the appeal of Poe’s extravagant 
language and the deep reverence and respect many have for its author,78 not all justices or legal 
scholars appreciate its historical or deductive justifications. 
C. Justice Hugo L. Black and the Total Incorporation Doctrine 
Among Justice Harlan’s colleagues, the most influential79 and vocal critic was Justice 
Hugo L. Black, who on “many occasions … express[ed] … [a] strong belief that there is no 
constitutional support whatsoever” for the doctrine of substantive due process.80 Such assured 
opposition stemmed from three related premises: (1) the text and history of the Due Process 
Clause demonstrate that it guarantees procedural, not substantive rights;81 (2) substantive due 
process is a mechanism for Supreme Court justices to interject their own predilections and 
determine what they believe to be “fair” rather than what is a genuine constitutional right;82 and 
 
76 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
77 Id.
78 GEOFFREY R. STONE, THE FIRST AMENDMENT lxiii (Aspen 2nd ed. 2003); see also Cass R. 
Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, THE NEW REPUBLIC (August 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20050801&s=sunstein080105 (calling Justice Harlan a “great 
conservative voice” on the Warren Court). 
79 See Akhil Reed Amar, Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 1221, 1222 (2002) 
(stating that “Justice Black ranks as one of the greatest constitutional jurists of the last century, a 
first-ballot hall-of-famer”); id. at 1247-48 (concluding that Justice Black was the intellectual 
leader of the Warren Court). 
80 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675-76 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). 
81 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (citing Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co.,
18 How. 272, 276 (1856) (“the words, ‘due process of law,’ were undoubtedly intended to 
convey the same meaning as the words ‘by the law of the land’ in the Magna Carta”)). 
82 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 510 (conceding a personal preference, but nonetheless deciding the 
case in accordance with the text of the Constitution) (Black, J., dissenting); Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726, 730-31 (1963).  Of course, the temptation to rely upon fairness as a guidepost in 
interpretation persists to this day.  As Judge Frank H. Easterbrook frustratingly noted in United 
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(3) substantive due process doctrine allows for a method of interpretation that effectively amends 
the Constitution without utilizing the deliberative amendment process because it ignores the 
Supreme Court’s duty to place itself “as nearly as possible in the condition of the men who 
framed the instrument.”83 To the first criticism, there is little doubt that Justice Black is correct.  
Even those who support substantive due process acknowledge this limitation;84 and, as many 
commentators have observed, “substantive due process is not just an error, but a contradiction in 
terms.85 The Supreme Court has, in a sense, left readers of its “substantive due process cases … 
to feel like a moviegoer who arrived late and missed a crucial bit of exposition.  Where is the 
part that explains the connection between this doctrine and the text of the constitutional 
provisions from which it takes its name?”86 To the second and third criticisms, however, the 
 
States v. Logan, “[l]aws are not ‘harsh’ or ‘pointless’ in any value-free framework; they seem 
harsh or pointless by reference to a given judge’s beliefs about how things ought to work, which 
is why a claim of power to revise ‘harsh’ or ‘pointless’ laws elevates the judicial over the 
legislative branch and must be resisted.”  Slip Opinion at 9 (7th Cir. July 6, 2006).  
83 Id. (citing Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12).  But see Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 500-01 (1965) 
(submitting that Justice Black’s method of interpreting specific provisions of the Constitution, no 
less than the Due Process Clause, lends itself to the dangers of a judge’s personal predilections 
“whose constitutional outlook is simply to keep the Constitution in supposed ‘tune with the 
times’”) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
84 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (acknowledging that “a literal reading of the Clause might suggest 
that it governs only the procedures by which a State may deprive persons of liberty”) (joint 
opinion); id. at 847 (recognizing that due process’ roots are in the Magna Carta); Glucksberg,
521 U.S. at 760 n. 6 (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 14-30 (1980)) (acknowledging the Privileges and Immunities Clause rather 
than the Due Process Clause, is the “proper warrant for courts’ substantive oversight of state 
legislation”) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW VOL. ONE 1328-29 (Foundation Press 3rd ed. 2000) (commenting on the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause’s “apparent textual and historical superiority to the substantive 
due process method of incorporating and protecting fundamental rights”). 
85 John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 Va. L. Rev. 493, 494 
(1997); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980) 
(substantive due process is a “contradiction in terms-sort of like ‘green pastel redness’”); see also 
Mays v. City of East St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1001 (7th Cir. 1997) (observing that the fact that 
“’substantive due process’ is an oxymoron’” has led to a circuit split regarding some aspects of 
its doctrine) (Easterbrook, J.). 
86 Id. at 493.
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debate will endlessly continue.  Since Chief Justice John Marshall’s landmark opinion in 
Marbury v. Madison87 establishing the doctrine of judicial review, the Supreme Court has 
struggled to draw a line between interpretation and alteration.  While conservative jurists would 
argue that discovery of unenumerated fundamental rights is an unwarranted expansion of judicial 
authority, liberal-minded jurists see such measures as a fulfillment of their constitutional 
obligations.88 As Justice David H. Souter once pronounced, using words first made famous by 
Chief Justice John Marshall, “it is a constitution we are expounding.”89 
In addition to a forceful critique of Justice Harlan’s view of substantive due process, 
Justice Black offered “eccentric”90 support for his own affirmative theory of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: total incorporation.  Under this doctrine, the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated 
the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights and made them applicable to the states.91 Thus, 
following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, state as well as federal laws would be 
invalidated as violative of the Constitution if they infringed on the substantive guarantees of the 
Bill of Rights.  However, those rights not explicitly enumerated in the Bill of Rights could not 
later be discovered in open-ended constitutional clauses such as the Ninth Amendment or the 
Due Process Clause.92 
87 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). 
88 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment, Federalism, and Judicial Activism: 
Questions and Answers: The Wages of Crying Wolf Revisited: The Essential Consanguinity of 
Lochner, Roe, and Eastern Enterprises, 1 Geo. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 133, 133 (2002). 
89 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (quoting M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 
(1819))). 
90 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
91 Id. at 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment 94 (1908)). 
92 See e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507-27 (rejecting Justice Goldberg’s reliance on the Ninth 
Amendment and Justice Harlan’s approach under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Black’s understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment “was the product of years of 
study …, reading and rereading primary and secondary sources that his fellow Justices had 
ignored or slighted.”93 This research culminated in his dissent in Adamson v. California, where 
he made three notable findings: the Fourteenth Amendment was designed (1) to make the Bill of 
Rights (the first eight Amendments) binding upon the States; (2) to give validity to the Civil 
Rights Bill; and (3) to declare who were citizens of the United States.94 An illustrative and 
famous example95 of total incorporation can be found in the dissent of Griswold v. Connecticut.96 
In Griswold, the Supreme Court was again confronted with C.G.S.A. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958), 
the Connecticut statute that made it illegal to provide “information, instruction, and medical 
advice to married persons as to the means of preventing conception.”97 Unlike its decision in 
Poe, a majority of the Court reached the merits of the case and held that it was “repulsive” to the 
Constitution.98 Writing for the majority, Justice William O. Douglas reasoned that the First, 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments have “penumbras,” which create a “zone of 
privacy” that protected the conduct at issue.99 Concurring in the result, Justice Harlan reaffirmed 
his belief that the Due Process Clause was the appropriate mechanism to question the 
arbitrariness of the legislation and protect “basic values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.’”100 In dissent, Justice Black placed aside his personal feelings regarding the statute’s 
fairness and deemed it constitutional: “I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am 
 
93 Amar, supra note 79, at 1232-33. 
94 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Flack, The Adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 94 (1908)). 
95 See Amar, supra note 79, at 1246-47 (commenting on how Justice Black’s “famous[]” dissent 
has quelled recognition of his leadership on the Warren Court). 
96 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 506-27 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). 
97 Id. at 480 (citing C.G.S.A. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1958)). 
98 Id. at 484-86. 
99 Id. at 484. 
100 Id. at 500 (quoting Palko v. Conneticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (date) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
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nevertheless compelled to admit that government has the right to invade it unless prohibited by 
some specific constitutional provision.”101 He then sharply criticized Justice Harlan’s “natural 
law” approach, and in an instructive footnote, discounted any notion that the discretion of judges 
could be limited by spelling out superficial “catchwords and catch phrases.”102 In Justice 
Black’s view, phrases such as “shock the conscience,”103 or “fundamental notions of fairness,”104 
“inherent,”105 “fundamental”106 or “essential”107 sound “impressive,” but they “are all that … lie 
behind [a] decision” based on personal preferences.108 
D. In the Wake of Justices Harlan and Black: “Split-the-Difference Jurisprudence” 
 Despite offering a significant critique of Justice Harlan’s natural law approach and a 
persuasive (albeit simplistic)109 argument in support of total incorporation doctrine, Justice Black 
never garnered a majority opinion in support of his position.110 The Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts sought to limit both the number of unenumerated rights and method utilized to discover 
them, but neither adopted an absolutist, textualist view of the Bill of Rights.111 On the contrary, 
when the substantive due process issue, abortion, finally re-crystallized before the Supreme 
Court in the 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, recent Republican appointees David H. 
Souter and Anthony M. Kennedy joined Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in a joint opinion, which 
 
101 Id. at 510. 
102 Id. at 511 n. 4. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 




109 Amar, supra note 79, at 1232. 
110 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 847 (noting that Justice Black’s total incorporation doctrine has never 
been the “accepted … view”) (citing Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68-92) (joint opinion). 
111 See e.g., Glucksberg, (adopting a “conservative” approach to the discovery of new substantive 
due process rights, but nevertheless commenting that the potential for new rights exists).  
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rejected principle in favor of a politically compromising and pragmatic approach.112 Thus, rather 
than clarifying substantive due process doctrine, the intellectual struggle between Justices Black 
and Harlan created a convoluted doctrine113 increasingly contingent upon respective 
appointments to the Supreme Court.114 The constitutional environment, in other words, became 
ripe for the development of split-the-difference substantive due process jurisprudence. 
 In Casey, the petitioners were abortion clinics and a class of physicians who brought suit 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from a Pennsylvania statute, which made it illegal for a 
physician to perform an abortion on a married woman who fails to provide certain documentary 
proof of spousal notification.115 The district court held that all provisions of the statute were 
unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction, but the United States Court of Appeals for 
 
112 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 945 (characterizing the joint opinion’s outcome as an “unjustified 
constitutional compromise”) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting 
in part); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 982 (2000) (characterizing the joint opinion 
as created out of “whole cloth”) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  But see Casey, 505 U.S. at 865-66 
(implying that the decision to preserve the central holding of Roe is principled) (joint opinion). 
113 See Note, David B. Anders, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute 
Between Justice O’Connor and Justice Scalia Over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61
Fordham L. Rev. 895, 922 (1993) (stating that the current debate regarding unenumerated rights 
“harks back” to the debate between Justices Harlan and Black); see also Toni M. Massaro, 
Reviving Hugo Black?: The Court’s “Jot For Jot” Account of Substantive Due Process, 73
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1086, 1121 (1998) (concluding that Justice Black and Justice Harlan’s views of 
substantive due process are “wholly incompatible logics” that “now struggle within this 
doctrine” and create “a tension that is becoming increasingly insistent” on Supreme Court 
intervention). 
114 See Layla Summers, The Future of the Abortion Right: Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood & The 
Roberts Court, 5 Whittier J. Child & Fam. Advoc. 669, 688 (2006) (“History has shown that the 
right to abortion is one that evolves given the composition of the Court, and thus, new 
appointments are crucially important to the future and development of the right [to abortion]”); 
see also Casey, 505 U.S. at 943 (recognizing that the decision in Casey depended on “but a 
single vote” that may change when the issue of abortion is again brought before the Court 
subsequent Justice Blackmun stepping down) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); id. at 843 (recognizing that the “definition of liberty 
is still questioned” two decades after Roe) (joint opinion). 
115 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 3203-3220 (1990). 
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the Third Circuit, with then-Judge Alito dissenting, affirmed in part and reversed in part.  On 
certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
 Casey’s “elaborate” analysis of stare decisis116 served to justify the preservation of the 
“central holding of Roe,”117 but it nevertheless offered an intriguing historical dialogue on the 
source of substantive due process.  Interestingly, the joint opinion began by acknowledging that 
the “most familiar of the substantive liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are those 
recognized by the Bill of Rights” and conceding that a temptation exists, as a means of curbing 
“discretion of federal judges, to suppose that liberty encompasses no more than those rights 
already guaranteed … by the first eight Amendments to the Constitution.”118 However, the joint 
opinion reaffirmed that the Supreme Court has “never accepted that view.”  On the contrary, it 
cited to a number of circumstances in which arbitrary state legislation was correctly invalidated 
as violative of a substantive, fundamental right despite finding no source in the text of the 
Constitution.119 According to the joint opinion, the Bill of Rights does not “mark[] the outer 
limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.”120 
The joint opinion firmly rejected the principles set forth by Justice Black in Adamson, but
it fell short of the eloquent and well-expressed approach of Justice Harlan in Poe. While it cited 
Poe with liberality, it did not generate the certainty and stability associated with a sound 
common law conclusion.  Instead, the joint opinion reaffirmed Roe’s collection of isolated cases 
of a “deep, personal character,”121 and prematurely concluded, reminiscent of Allgeyer, that “the 
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
 
116 TRIBE, supra note 84, at 1322. 
117 Casey, 505 U.S. at 853. 
118 Id. at 843 (citing Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
119 Id. at 847-48 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 
94-99 (1987); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977)). 
120 Id. at 848 (citing U.S. CONST. AMEND. IX). 
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and of the mystery of human life.”122 This deduction did not “pay respect to detail, seeking to 
understand old principles afresh by new examples and new counterexamples.”123 By most 
accounts, a reading of those cases does not clearly endorse “an all-encompassing ‘right to 
privacy.’”124 
Casey’s “ultimately cryptic”125 holding represented a squandered opportunity to clarify 
substantive due process doctrine and it marked the beginning of the Rehnquist Court’s split-the-
difference jurisprudence.  Rather than acknowledging the superior pedigree of Justice Black’s 
total incorporation doctrine and thus approach fundamental rights in an all-or-nothing manner, or 
at minimum, faithfully adopting the calculated and cautious (albeit flawed) balancing test of 
Justice Harlan, the Supreme Court, in a “sadly ironic” reduced “certainty and predictability”126 
by attempting to split-the-difference in reasoning (not to mention split-the-difference in the 
national political debate), by adopting the now infamous “undue burden” standard for abortion 
regulations.127 Following Casey, abortion was still considered in some respects to be a 
“fundamental right,” but it was capable of regulation repugnant to other recognized rights such 
 
121 Id. at 853. 
122 Id. at 851. 
123 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 770 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).  But see Wilkinson, 
supra note 1, at 1988 (stating that Roe was the “culmination of earlier minimalist steps”) (citing 
LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT 
JOURNEY 72-101 (Henry Holt & Co. 2005)) 
124 Casey, 505 U.S. at 951 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part).  But see Casey, 505 U.S. at 940 (arguing that the Court’s “personal liberty cases” have 
created more than merely a “laundry list of particular rights”) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
125 Erin Daly, The New Liberty, 11 Widener L. Rev. 221, 232 (2005). 
126 Id. at 233. 
127 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
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as freedom of expression or free exercise of religion.  This result momentarily quelled outrage on 
both sides of the political debate while simultaneously satisfying neither.128 
In the years following Casey, the justices escalating and much observed willingness to 
write separately (sometimes to express disagreement with reasoning that would otherwise appear 
minor), resulted in constitutional law “becoming an aggregation of nine idiosyncratic theories 
and nine bodies of personal precedent [][t]o a degree that would have shocked the 
Founders….”129 As a result of this declining consensus on the Court, the attraction of split-the-
difference jurisprudence further increased.  Now, with Justice Kennedy firmly situated as the 
Supreme Court’s swing vote, a major challenge to the Roberts Court will be to find common 
ground among strongly competing judicial philosophies. 
III. THE ROBERTS COURT 
 
A. Justice Antonin G. Scalia 
 
128 In effect, Casey made certain that regardless of the analytic framework, unenumerated 
fundamental rights under the pretext of substantive due process were in no immediate danger of 
abolition.  They are, so to speak, prescriptive easements over the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See Robert Bork, Enforcing a “Mood,” The New Criterion, at 
www.newcriterion.com/archives/24/02/enforcing-mood/ (last visited June 29, 2006).  While 
most civic-minded citizens cannot even identify sitting Supreme Court justices, they are acutely 
aware of their “right to abortion” or their “right to free speech.”  Jimmy Moore, Poll: Six Out of 
Ten Americans Cannot Identify Any Cabinet Departments, Hawaii Reporter (November 7, 2003), 
available at http://www.hawaiireporter.com/story.aspx?8f3483a2-8c8b-4ae5-97c8-7c3b7b646f39 
(last visited June 29, 2006).  Recognizing this fact, during the confirmation hearing of Justice 
Alito, Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter curiously asked whether “the right to 
abortion” is “super-precedent.”  Robert F. Nagel, Bowing to Precedent, The Weekly Standard 
(April 17, 2006), available at 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=12083&R=ECC7422 
(last visited June 29, 2006).  Although Justice Alito coyly responded by stating that such 
terminology “reminded him ‘of the size of the laundry detergent in the supermarket,’” the 
exchange was a testament to enduring influence of fundamental rights.  Id.
129 Nelson Lund & Craig S. Lerner, Precedent Bound?, National Review Online (March 6, 
2006), at http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/lund_lerner200603060828.asp (last visited 
June 29, 2006). 
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Recent scholarship has suggested that close parallels can be drawn between the 
jurisprudence of Justice Black and Justice Scalia.130 While this scholarship has, perhaps, raised 
the interesting premise that a staunch supporter of President Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation131 
and a socially and religiously conservative Republican132 can share similar judicial philosophies, 
it does not translate well into a discussion of substantive due process doctrine.  Although both 
justices share a strong preference for textualism and originalism, Justice Black took a more 
principled approach to the recognition of unenumerated fundamental rights.  As evident from his 
dissent in Griswold, Justice Black never split-the-difference in reasoning or conceded to Justice 
Harlan and his fluid mechanism for invalidating social regulation. 
Justice Scalia is known for rabble-rousing comments on the legitimacy of substantive due 
process,133 but he is not an absolutist.134 On the contrary, since his controversial plurality 
opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., Justice Scalia has settled into a position, which substantially 
restricts, but does not abolish, substantive rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.  In 
Michael H., a man whose blood tests indicated there was a 98.07% probability of paternity 
challenged a California statute that presumed that a child born to a married woman living with 
her husband is a child of the marriage.135 The mother of the child lived with another man who 
 
130 See, e.g., Akil Reed Amar, Rethinking Originalism, SLATE (September 21, 2005), at 
http://www.slate.com/id/2126680/ (last visited August 3, 2006); Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of 
Two Textualists: A Critical Comparison of Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. Rev. 25 (1994). 
131 STONE, supra note 78 at lvii. 
132 TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 204 (describing Justice Scalia has a “devout Catholic” who 
“opposed abortion on moral grounds” because he “believed that abortion were indeed murders”). 
133 See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (rejecting the “proposition that the Due 
Process Clause guarantees certain (unspecified) liberties, rather than merely guarantees certain 
procedures as a prerequisite to deprivation of liberty”). 
134 See Albright, 510 U.S. at 275 (rejecting “the proposition that the Due Process Clause 
guarantees certain (unspecified) liberties,” but nevertheless conceding that he has acknowledged 
the doctrine of substantive due process) (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) 
(plurality opinion of Justice Scalia)) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
135 1981 Cal. Stats., ch. 1180, p. 4761 § 621. 
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was presumed to be the father under the statute.  Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice 
Scalia engaged in a two pronged analysis to determine whether the statute violated the plaintiff’s 
substantive due process rights.  First, Justice Scalia framed the issue in narrow terms: “whether 
the relationship between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria has been treated as a 
protected family unit under the historic practices of our society, or whether on any other basis it 
has been accorded special protection.”136 Second, Justice Scalia engaged in a historical analysis 
to determine whether the plaintiff’s liberty interest, as defined by Justice Scalia, has been 
traditionally protected at common law.137 Given the exceedingly narrow level of generality used 
to frame the issue, the Court concluded that the interests at hand did not warrant protection as a 
fundamental right, and therefore, were subject to “the ordinary ‘rational relationship’ test.”138 
Fundamentally, Justice Scalia’s justification for implementing his methodology is to 
avoid arbitrary decisionmaking139 and limit the discretion of judges so as to conform to, as he 
views it, the designed role of the judiciary.140 Quoting a famous dissent of Justice Byron R. 
White, he stated: 
That the Court has ample precedent for the creation of new constitutional rights 
should not lead it to repeat the process at will. The Judiciary, including this Court, 
is the most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-
made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or 
even the design of the Constitution. Realizing that the present construction of the 
Due Process Clause represents a major judicial gloss on its terms, as well as on 
the anticipation of the Framers . . ., the Court should be extremely reluctant to 
 
136 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124. 
137 Id. at 124-27. 
138 Id. at 131. 
139 Id. at 127 n. 6. 
140 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (stating that “[t]he reason for insistence on 
legislative primacy is obvious and fundamental: ‘[I]n a democratic society legislatures, not 
courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people’”) 
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175-176 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and 
Stevens, JJ.) (internal quotations omitted)) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Michael H., 491 U.S. 
at 127 n. 6 (reasoning that a broad level of generality permits judges to “dictate rather than 
discern society’s views”). 
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breathe still further substantive content into the Due Process Clause so as to strike 
down legislation adopted by a State or city to promote its welfare. Whenever the 
Judiciary does so, it unavoidably pre-empts for itself another part of the 
governance of the country without express constitutional authority.141 
In light of these warnings, Justice Scalia devised his two-pronged analysis.  By narrowly framing 
the issue, a significant avenue of judicial manipulation and results oriented jurisprudence was 
eliminated.  No longer could judges devise their own question-begging level of generality for 
framing the issue, which would inevitably result in the desired outcome.142 Moreover, by 
grounding the discovery of substantive due process rights in history and tradition, there was little 
danger that this undemocratic process would proceed too quickly.143 
To Justice Scalia’s critics, the difficulties with this methodology are obvious.  Sharply 
dissenting in Michael H., Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. disagreed with the decision to utilize a 
narrow level of generality in framing the issue or to rely upon history and tradition 
unrepentantly.  Rather than disputing the dangers of arbitrary decisionmaking, Justice Brennan 
warned his colleagues not to be “seduc[ed]” by Justice Scalia’s claims of objectivity because 
what traditions are “deeply rooted” is “arguable;”144 and cautioned against the danger of defining 
the scope of liberty so narrow that it would “[t]ransform[] the protection afforded by the Due 
Process Clause into a redundancy [that] mocks those who, with care and purpose, wrote the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”145 While these criticisms did little to impact the jurisprudence of 
Justice Scalia, they have, in conjunction with the writings of Justice Harlan, served as a powerful 
 
141 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 121 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) 
(White, J., dissenting)) (plurality). 
142 See Michael H., 491 U.S. 127 n. 6 (concluding that a narrow level of generality binds judges 
to the rule of law rather than what “they think best when the unanticipated occurs”).  
143 See generally id. at 126-27. 
144 Id. at 137-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
145 Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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influence on those members of the Court seeking to split-the-difference between the conservative 
reasoning of Justice Scalia and a more liberal reading of the Due Process Clause. 
B. Justice David M. Souter 
 
Justice Souter’s approach to substantive due process can be aptly characterized as 
antagonistic to Justice Scalia’s.  Instead of heading warnings over unfettered judicial discretion 
and the unwarranted expansion of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Souter has 
sought to liberalize the doctrine by instituting an approach, which mimics in part Justice Harlan’s 
in Poe v. Ulman.146 Justice Souter regards Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe as the modern source 
of the second coming of substantive due process,147 and distinguishes himself in only respect.  
While Justice Harlan appeared to present his dissent in Poe as an approach that applied equally 
in force to both executive and legislative action, Justice Souter believes that the “criteria to 
identify what is fatally arbitrary differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a 
governmental officer.”148 
In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, parents of a motorcycle passenger killed in a high-
speed police chase sued alleging deprivation of their son’s substantive due process right to 
life.149 The District Court granted summary judgment, 150 but the Ninth Circuit reversed, 
reasoning that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the police officers were 
deliberate indifferent in pursuing the deceased and the driver of the motorcycle.151 The Supreme 
 
146 Although Justice Souter has sought to liberalize doctrine he has nevertheless at times used 
caution by refusing to implement his approach.  See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 62-79 
(2000) (stating that the issues presented could have been addressed by interpreting the state 
statute at issue rather than “turning any fresh furrows in the ‘treacherous field’ of substantive due 
process”) (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 502 (Powell, J.)) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
147 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 762-63. 
148 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846. 
149 Id. at 836-37. 
150 Id. at 837-38. 
151 Id. at 839. 
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Court granted certiorari to address the Ninth Circuit’s “deliberate indifference” standard and 
resolve the conflict between the Circuits over the standard of culpability required to find a 
violation of substantive due process in the context of a police pursuit.152 Writing for a majority 
of the Court, Justice Souter determined that the police officers’ conduct did not constitutionally 
“shock the conscience.”153 A higher degree of culpability was required because liability in 
circumstances such as this must turn on the good faith effort of the police officers.154 
The centerpiece of Justice Souter’s executive action-substantive due process doctrine is 
Rochin v. California and its invocation of the “shocks the conscience” standard.  By its very 
terms, the test connotes a significant level of discretion and flexibility, which is designed to 
protect against executive action that is perceived to be arbitrary under the circumstances.  As 
Justice Souter noted, substantive due process 
formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other 
specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights.  Its application is less a 
matter of rule.  Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of 
facts in a given case.  That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of 
fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other 
circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial.155 
Thus, by way of example, a police chase that results in the death of a suspect, such as in Lewis,
may not shock the conscious, but the egregious and unnecessary forced pumping of a suspect’s 
stomach to recover evidence of drug possession would satisfy the standard.156 
Justice Souter recognizes the significant limitations of the shock-the-conscience 
standard,157 but nevertheless invokes it in the context of executive action in the belief that its 
 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 855. 
154 Id. at 852-53. 
155 Id. at 850 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942). 
156 See id. at 846-47 (discussing Rochin). 
28
flexibility will prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from becoming a “font of tort law to be 
superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States[.]”158 By 
avoiding any duplication of traditional common-law fault, greater care is made to avoid liability 
simply because a person is “cloaked with state authority.”159 Or, as Justice Souter explained, 
“executive action challenges raise a particular need to preserve the constitutional proportions of 
constitutional claims.”160 Consequently, by Justice Souter’s measure, substantive due process 
protection will only be afforded when state actors engage in behavior that is so egregious that it 
“violates the ‘decencies of civilized conduct.’”161 
Despite Justice Souter willingness establish a high burden under the pretext of a “shocks-
the-conscience” standard, Justice Scalia denounced Lewis’ fluid and imprecise methodology as 
well as its legislative-executive distinction.  As to its methodology, Justice Scalia first pointed 
out that it is an apparent departure from the recent precedent, Washington v. Glucksberg, a case 
that adopted a derivative of the two-pronged test set forth in the plurality opinion in Michael 
H.:162 
157 See id. at 847 (“While the measure of what is conscious shocking is no calibrated yard stick, it 
does, as Judge Friendly put it, ‘point the way’”) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). 
158 Id. at 848 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)) (internal quotations omitted). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 847 n. 8. 
161 Id. at 846 (quoting Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172-73). 
162 In Glucksberg, terminally ill patients challenged a Washington state statute banning the 
practice of assisted suicide.  Writing for a majority of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
concluded that recognition of a substantive due process right required (1) a determination of 
whether the right had been “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition’” 
and (2) a “careful description” of the asserted right.  521 U.S. at 720-21 (citation omitted).  This 
two-pronged approach mirrors the method adopted by Justice Scalia in Michael H., with the 
exception of the specificity required to frame the issue.  See generally Basiak, supra note 74, at 
418-418 n.109. 
In other words, Michael H., by all appearances, features a narrower level of generality used to 
characterize the potential fundamental right. 
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Today’s opinion gives the lie to those cynics who claim that changes in this 
Court’s jurisprudence are attributable to changes in the Court’s membership.  It 
proves that the changes are attributable to nothing but the passage of time (not 
much time, at that), plus application of the ancient maxim, “That was then, is 
now.”163 
But more importantly, Justice Scalia also brashly questioned how courts could determine 
whether executive action shocked the conscience: “Adhering to our decision in Glucksberg,
rather than ask whether the police conduct here at issue shocks my unelected conscious, I would 
ask whether our Nation has traditionally protected the right respondents assert.”164 His concern, 
as made evident from previous substantive due process cases, was how courts could appropriate 
limit themselves to their designed constitutional role: “In allocating such risks, the people of 
California and their elected representatives may vote their consciences.  But for judges to 
overrule that democratically adopted policy judgment on the ground that it shocks their 
consciences is not judicial review but judicial governance.”165 Although Justice Scalia’s 
reasoning failed command a majority in Lewis, these concerns did not fall silent on Chief Justice 
Rehnquist or, more importantly, Justice Kennedy.  In words that would eventually prove ironic, 
by Justice Kennedy’s assessment, the “shocks-the-conscience” test carries with it an “unfortunate 
connotation” because it is “standard laden with subjective assessments;”166 it splits-the-
difference in reasoning by failing to adopt an approach capable of universal application.  Thus, 
according to Justice Kennedy, it should be viewed “with considerable skepticism.”167 
163 Id. at 860. 
164 Id. at 862. 
165 Id. at 865 (emphasis in original). 
166 Id. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
167 Id. This skepticism has proved to be warranted because many lower courts have had 
difficulty in interpreting Lewis’ shock-the-conscience standard.  Robert Chesney, Old Wine or 
New? The Shocks-the-Conscience Standard and the Distinction Between Legislative and 
Executive Action, 50 Syracuse L. Rev. 981, 1000 (2000) (citing Khan v. Gallitano, 180 F.3d 829, 
836 (7th Cir. 1999); Singleton v. Cicil, 176 F.3d 419, 425 n. 7 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Payne v. 
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C. Justice Clarence Thomas 
 
Although Justice Scalia is often credited with being the Supreme Court’s recognized 
conservative, Justice Clarence Thomas has quietly distinguished himself from his more well-
known colleague with a “profound and far-reaching jurisprudence.”168 Unlike Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, who eventually succumb to the seductive qualities of split-the-difference 
jurisprudence, or Justice Scalia, who, just recently and surprisingly accepted an expansive 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause,169 Justice Thomas has 
rejected any evolution in his constitutional jurisprudence.  His exceedingly conservative (some 
would even say “bizarre”) positions make him a unique and often the sole dissenter on the 
Court,170 but they also demonstrate that Justice Thomas is arguably the most process-oriented, 
intellectually consistent justice.  Many members of the Supreme Court, past and present, have 
compromised doctrine in favor of results-oriented, split-the-difference jurisprudence.  Justice 
Thomas has compromised little since joining the Court and, like Justice Black before him, 
appears willing to defend doctrine over any result.171 
Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1040 (7th Cir. 1998); Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 
504, 529 (10th Cir. 1998); Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 571 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
168 John C. Eastman, Taking Justice Thomas Seriously, 2 Green Bag 2d 425, 426 (1999).  
“Thomas’ ‘classical liberal’ originalism differs in significant respects from Borkean conservative 
originalism often attributed to Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia (not 
to mention Robert Bork himself).  It is a jurisprudence … that seeks to uncover (and recover) the 
original principles rather than merely the original practice of the Founders.  And it is a 
jurisprudence rooted in the self-evident truths of human nature and the inalienable rights derived 
from that nature, as articulated in the Declaration of Independence.”  Id.
169 See Raich v. Ashcroft,
170 Eastman, supra note 168, at 426; see also TUSHNET, supra note 6, at 86 (stating that Justice 
Thomas will more often “los[e] a Court” because of strong opinions, which draw sharp lines). 
171 See United States v. New York Times, 403 U.S. 713, 714-15 (1971) (stating that “every 
moment’s continuance” of the injunctions against newspapers, which were poised to divulge 
classified intelligence, amounted to a “flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First 
Amendment”) (Black, J., concurring); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 60-61 
(1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (rejecting any balancing approach to the First Amendment under 
the belief that the men who drafted the Bill of Rights “did all the ‘balancing’ that was to be done 
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Given Justice Thomas’ uncompromising approach, it is no surprise that he has not 
authored a single seminal substantive due process case since his tenure on the Court.  After all, 
far too commonly, decisions on substantive due process, and especially enumerated fundamental 
rights, are the product of negotiation and political posturing.  One need only look to the joint 
opinion in Casey and its so-called undue burden test to reach this conclusion.  As Justice Thomas 
noted in Stenberg v. Carhart, the “Casey joint opinion was constructed by its authors out of 
whole cloth.  The standard is a product of its authors’ own philosophical views about abortion, 
and it should go without saying that it has no origins in or relationship to the Constitution and is, 
consequently, as illegitimate as the standard it purported to replace.”172 Since Casey, Justice 
Thomas has continued to plainly and concisely refute majority positions on substantive due 
process and offer intriguing insight into his desire to shift substantive due process into a 
framework that may serve as a more appropriate historical basis for unenumerated fundamental 
rights. 
 The simplicity of Justice Thomas’ approach to constitutional law is exemplified in the 
dissent of Lawrence v. Texas.173 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court reversed Texas criminal court 
rulings affirming the convictions of two men for “deviate sexual intercourse with another 
individual of the same sex.”174 Writing for a six-three majority of the Court, Justice Kennedy 
overturned the defendants’ convictions by determining that the term “liberty” under the Due 
 
in this field”); Gerhardt, at 26.  Justice Thomas’ most controversial opinion in this regard is no 
doubt Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), where he argued in dissent that prisoners beaten 
by guards have no cause of action under the Eight Amendment because the conduct, while 
tortious, did not constitute “punishment” for the purposes of the “cruel and unusual punishment” 
clause.  Id. at 17-30. 
172 Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 982 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
173 Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
174 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003).  “Deviate sexual intercourse” is defined as 
“any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another 
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “presumes an autonomy of the self that includes 
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”175 The Texas criminal 
statute could not withstand scrutiny because the conduct at issue “involve[d] liberty of the person 
both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.”176 In dissent, Justice Thomas recognized 
the majority’s frustration with Texas’ misguided and ill-advised attempts to legislate harmless, 
private and consensual adult, sexual activity, but disagreed with their decision overstep their 
limited judicial function and question the wisdom of the legislation.  Invoking the words of 
Justice Stewart in Griswold, he acknowledged that legislation punishing a person for his 
expressing his sexual preference through harmless, consensual sexual conduct was 
“uncommonly silly.”177 Nevertheless, Justice Thomas explained in a manner reminiscent of 
Justice Black, that, as a member of the Supreme Court, he was “not empowered to help [the] 
petitioners” because his “duty … is to ‘decide cases agreeable to the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.’”178 A “general right of privacy,” or as the Court termed it in Lawrence, “the 
‘liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions,” could not be found 
by Justice Thomas in the Constitution.179 
Despite a firm rejection of the doctrine of substantive due process and Justice Kennedy’s 
broad and imprecise language, Justice Thomas has not discounted the possibility that 
unenumerated fundamental rights can be discovered from the text of the Constitution.  Some 
well-known originalists such as Judge Robert H. Bork reject enumerated rights outright and read 
 
person; or … the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.”  Id. at 
§ 21.01(1). 
175 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2498 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting)) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (some internal quotations omitted). 
179 Id.
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open-ended clauses of the Constitution to be superfluous,180 but Justice Thomas has never taken 
such an affirmative stance.  Instead, he has indicated a clear preference for making any such 
determinations within the framework of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which, as noted, 
has been effectively read out of the Constitution as a result of the Slaughter House Cases.
In Troxel v. Granville, grandparents petitioned the Washington Superior Court for the 
right to visit their grandchildren.  After the grandchildren’s motion opposed any visitation, the 
Washington Superior Court entered a visitation order.  When the Washington Supreme Court 
reversed the visitation order, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.  A 
plurality of the Court determined that a Washington statute granting grandparents certain 
visitation rights violated the mother’s substantive due process right to child-rearing.  Concurring 
in the judgment, Justice Thomas expressed no opinion on the substantive due process issue or 
whether the Due Process Clause’s original understanding included unenumerated fundamental 
rights.181 However, intriguingly, in a footnote he also stated that the case did not involve a 
challenge to the Washington statute based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause.  Therefore, 
the opportunity to “reevaluate the meaning of that Clause” remained available for a future 
case.182 
Justice Thomas’ eagerness to reevaluate the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause is motivated by his belief that the Clause’s demise has led “in no small part to the current 
disarray of our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.”183 Only when substantive due process is 
abolished can the Court, according to Justice Thomas, determine whether unenumerated rights, 
 
180 Judge Bork famously referred to the Ninth Amendment as an “inkblot,” because its meaning 
is irretrievable due to its indefinite language.  See Randy Barnett, A Ninth Amendment for 
Today’s Constitution, 26 Valparaiso Un. L. Rev. 419, 419 (1991) (citing Judge Bork’s 
confirmation hearing before the Senate). 
181 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80. 
182 Id. at 80 n. 1 (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527-28 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)). 
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such as “the right to privacy,” can be discovered in the Constitution.  It is clear, however, that 
even with the rebirth of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Justice Thomas would not 
introduce “yet another convenient tool for invention new rights, limited solely by the 
‘predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this Court.’”184 Thus, even if 
the Court were to ground unenumerated rights in the Privileges and Immunities Clause rather 
than the Due Process Clause, it is unlikely that Justice Thomas would recognized the legitimacy 
of Roe and its privacy-based progeny, or split-the-difference in result by recognizing their 
precedential force. 
D. Justice Stephen G. Breyer 
In 2005, Justice Stephen G. Breyer published a book entitled Active Liberty: Interpreting 
Our Democratic Constitution.185 It was a monumental occasion in the legal world because it is 
rare that a sitting Supreme Court justice presents a formal account of his jurisprudence.  
Unfortunately, despite its promise as a long-awaited liberal response to originalism, and its 
potential to offer the first detailed presentation of “non-originalism” jurisprudence,186 Active 
Liberty does not, in the words of Judge Bork, “qualify as a major intellectual event.”187 Rather 
than offering a formal, unifying method for constitutional and statutory interpretation, Justice 
Breyer, as typical with other non-originalists, merely offers counterarguments to originalism and 
presents ad-hoc rationales for difficult, divisive cases.  While he acknowledges the benefits of a 
 
183 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 527-28 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
184 Id. at 528 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 
(1977)). 
185 STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (Alfred 
A. Knopf 2005). 
186 Active Liberty was intended to refute the arguments raised by Justice Scalia in his book A
Matter of Interpretation. Nina Totenburg, Justice Breyer: The Case Against "Originalists", 
National Public Radio (September 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4930456 (last visited August 27, 2006).  
187 Bork, supra note 128, at www.newcriterion.com/archives/24/02/enforcing-mood/. 
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judge’s customary methods for interpretation, i.e. language, history, tradition, precedent, purpose 
and consequences, he conveniently abstains from any fixed labels.188 
Despite Justice Breyer’s failure to provide a unifying theory that would bind the judiciary 
to their designed institutional role, Active Liberty is unique in one respect: it expounds a 
“theme.”  To Justice Breyer, judges should interpret the Constitution in a manner that promotes 
“a government in which all citizens share and participate in the creation of public policy.189 
What this means, however, despite a “balanced and dispassionate tone,”190 is that Justice Breyer 
promotes a radical idea: judges should maintain the freedom to utilize balancing tests in all areas 
of constitutional law (not just in areas that textually justify balancing, i.e., the Fourth 
Amendment or procedural due process), that fail provide lower courts with guiding principles or 
remove the perception that the constitution is interpreted in light of a judge’s personal 
predilections. 
 The most striking example of Active Liberty’s shortcomings occurred in the 2004-2005 
Supreme Court term.  As noted in both Van Order v. Perry and McCreary County v. ACLU, the 
Court was confronted with the public display of the Ten Commandments on government 
property.  Despite the similarity of these facts, Justice Breyer alone found a constitutional 
distinction between the cases.  In justifying this result, Justice Breyer emphasized that "no single 
mechanical formula"191 or universal jurisprudence could "substitute for the exercise of legal 
judgment."192 Rather than limiting his institutional role by seeking cautious, but consistent 
guidance from a universal approach to interpreting the Constitution, Justice Breyer reserved the 
 
188 See BREYER, supra note 185, at 117. 
189 Id. at 15-16. 
190 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Consent of the Governed, NEW YORK TIMES (February 5, 2006), at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/05/books/review/05sullivan.html?ex=1154145600&en=6025b
1efcd0c4289&ei=5070 (last visited July 27, 2006). 
191 Van Order, 125 S. Ct. at 2868. 
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right to merely bind himself to his notion of active liberty and find unconstitutional a display, 
which, in his opinion, limits a religious minorities and non-Christians from participating in 
democratic government.  Not surprisingly, this decision dumbfounded many legal commentators 
and was questioned by those seeking guidance and clarity in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 
which had unfortunately become convoluted and overly complex. 
 Given the flexibility of active liberty and its capability of expounding result-splitting 
jurisprudence, it is surprising that Justice Breyer has had few opportunities to express views on 
substantive due process doctrine.193 Nevertheless, based on past practices, it can be predicted 
with little difficulty how Justice Breyer will vote in future cases.194 The more interesting issue is 
the apparent contradiction between support for substantive due process and active liberty.  
Substantive due process, by definition, is antidemocratic because it ascends certain rights beyond 
the review of the political majority.  Active liberty, by contrast, requires interpretation of the 
Constitution in a manner that promotes democratic participation.  If, by example, Justice Breyer 
continues to uphold the undue burden standard and preserve a weakened right to abortion, he will 
be removing the most politically divisive and emotionally charged issue in American politics 
from the political debate and forbidding citizens from participating in a democratic discussion on 
how best to reconcile their differences.  How can these two principles be reconciled?  According 
to Justice Breyer, a component to consider within the concept of active liberty is the concern for 
“dramatic legal change.”195 Thus, when abortion is the issue, Justice Breyer preserves the undue 
burden standard under the pretense that he can maneuver the competing interests so as to create 
the least controversial or destabilizing effect.  Neither the legitimacy of the undue burden 
 
192 Id. at 2869. 
193 Nor does Justice Breyer address substantive due process in Active Liberty.
194 In Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) Justice Breyer invalidated an abortion regulation 
by applying Justice O’Connor’s undue burden test.  Id. at 920.   
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standard, the expansion of judicial authority, nor the lack of jurisprudential guidance to lower 
courts is of major concern.196 
Criticism of Active Liberty is not to say that the promotion of citizens’ democratic 
participation in government is not an important goal – it is.  The difficulty with Active Liberty is 
that it seeks to accomplish its goal through “interpretation” of the Constitution, which by most 
accounts, must be done within the designed framework of the Constitution.  Regardless of the 
importance of active liberty or its apprehension for dramatic legal change, the judiciary cannot 
simply rewrite or update constitutional principles for the modern, pragmatic world when it must 
remain confined to a much more narrow institutional function.  Therefore, in the event Justice 
Breyer explicitly elaborates on active liberty in a future substantive due process case, it is likely 
the justices will write separately seeking to avoid broad pronouncements on the increased role 
for the Supreme Court in promoting democratic participation in government.  His difference-
splitting results, however, will continue to gain favor unless a more attractive, minimalist 
approach can be promoted.  
E. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy 
 Criticizing Justice Kennedy for his split-the-difference jurisprudence is, unfortunately, 
nothing new.  As Supreme Court commentator Dahlia Lithwick recently observed, “Kennedy’s 
inability to find certain, easy answers and his tendency to hold grandiose hopes for the law are 
fodder for his detractors.  This is the Kennedy of Casey, and Lawrence, and Rapanos, and it’s the 
Kennedy that plows up fields of constitutional law and sows of confusion and inscrutable 
 
195 BREYER, supra note 185, at 119. 
196 Id. at 116-18 (explaining how a jurisprudence need not set forth legal conclusions in terms of 
rules that will guide other institutions, including lower courts”). 
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grandeur in their place.”197 Given the monumental responsibility imputed on Justice Kennedy as 
a result of his transformation as the Court’s “swing vote,” it is important to scrutinize his 
decisions and evaluate whether his reasoning is fundamentally based upon the text, structure and 
history of the Constitution.  Although some attacks on him are regrettably personal or verbose in 
nature (James Dobson famously called him “the most dangerous man in America”),198 much of 
the legal and academic commentary is appropriate. 
 In the area of substantive due process doctrine, Justice Kennedy’s most recognized 
pronouncement occurred in Lawrence. As noted, Lawrence involved a challenge to a Texas 
criminal sodomy statute,199 which was invalidated by the Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision.200 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy utilized dramatic language designed to broadly 
characterize the liberty interest at stake and emphasize individual dignity and autonomy.201 The 
 
197 Dahlia Lithwick, No Man is an Island, SLATE (August 7, 2006), at 
www.slate.com/id/2147247/ (last visited August 7, 2006). 
198 Id.
199 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003).  “Deviate sexual intercourse” is defined as 
“any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another 
person; or … the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object.”  Id. at 
§ 21.01(1). 
200 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475. 
201 While many commentators have harshly criticized Justice Kennedy’s usage of expansive and 
indeterminate language, others have commended him for reading the Due Process Clause as if it 
should not be read in isolation.  According to Professor Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence 
is a narrative in which due process and equal protection, far from having separate 
missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal 
double helix.  It is a single, unfolding tale of equal liberty and increasingly 
universal dignity.  This tale centers on a quest for genuine self-government of 
groups small and large, from the most intimate to the most impersonal.   
Lawrence H. Tribe, The Fundamental Right that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 
1893, 1898 (2004).  If in fact Professor Tribe is correct in his assessment of Lawrence, then 
Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence could be compared favorably with the process-orientated 
approach to due process first articulated in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938), the most famous footnote in constitutional law; and it also be likened to 
the approach articulated in John Hart Ely’s monumental work, Democracy and Distrust: A 
Theory of Judicial Review.  However, Justice Kennedy’s failure to provide a suitable 
methodology for selecting the appropriate level of generality would remain problematic. 
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question presented to the Court therefore was whether a constitutionally recognized “liberty of 
the person in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions” requires the invalidation of a Texas 
statute “making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual 
conduct.”202 Drawing on cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe and Casey, he rejected the 
claim that the Court should focus its analysis narrowly as it had done in a previous sodomy case, 
Bowers v. Hardwick:203 
“The issue presented is whether Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right 
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of many 
States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.”  
That statement, we now conclude, discloses the Court’s own failure to appreciate 
the extent of the liberty at stake.  To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the 
right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put 
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is 
simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.204 
Next, Justice Kennedy discounted the usefulness of established history and tradition in 
constitutional decisionmaking: 
In all events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of 
most relevance here.  These references show an emerging awareness that liberty 
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their 
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.  “[H]istory and tradition are the starting 
point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process 
inquiry.”205 
Based on Justice Kennedy’s broad characterization of the liberty interest at stake, and his 
decision to emphasize “emerging” history and tradition, the Court concluded that the Due 
Process Clause protected the conduct at issue. 
 
202 Id.
203 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
204 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190) (citations omitted)). 
205 Id. at 2480 (emphasis added). 
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While many legal commentators commend the Court’s decision in Lawrence because it 
corresponded with their own personal political sympathies,206 and it protected a “discrete and 
insular minority,”207 those commentators fail to appreciate how Justice Kennedy’s split-the-
difference reasoning inappropriately expands the institutional role of the judiciary.  First, Justice 
Kennedy’s characterization of the issue before the Court was composed too broadly and without 
suitable explanation.  No justification for the level of generality is offered (other than to state that 
Bowers’ level of generality was too narrow) and no methodology is provided to formulate a 
consistent level of generality for future substantive due process cases.  Thus, if so inclined, 
judges are left to decide in a case by case fashion what level of generality is best suited to reach a 
results-orientated conclusion.  This ad-hoc approach permits “judges [to] improperly expand 
their role in government, infringe upon the responsibilities of political actors and violate the 
principle of separation of powers.”208 As Judge Frank H. Easterbrook has suggested, “[i]nstead 
of assuming power and then searching for a level of abstraction, the court should search for that 
degree of generality capable of justifying a judicial role.”209 Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, Justice Kennedy’s treatment of history and tradition leaves open the possibility that 
judges may constitutionalize conduct when there exists an “emerging awareness” that states are 
 
206 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 201. 
207 ELY, supra note 85, at 85-86. 
208 John F. Basiak, Jr., Inconsistent Levels of Generality in the Characterization of 
Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 16 Un. Fl. J. L. & Pub Pol’y 401, 403 n. 8 (2005). 
209 Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 349, 372 (1992).  
Solutions to results-orientated manipulation of the level of generality are, by most accounts, 
difficult to formulate so it is understandable that Justice Kennedy abstained from developing a 
methodology.  Justice Scalia has suggested that the “most specific” generality possible.  Michael 
H., 491 U.S. at 127 n. 6.  Others have offered a more pragmatic approach in light of the current, 
damaging inconsistencies.  See Basiak, supra note 207, at 432-33 (suggesting that a methodology 
that utilizes a “moderate” generality that is consistently applied is a plausible alternative). 
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engaging in certain social “experiments.”210 Rather than allowing states to exercise their police 
powers and modify or repeal laws dealing with the regulation of the health, safety and welfare of 
their citizens, the judiciary will be empowered with the ability to amend the constitution when a 
political trend can be recognized as social progress, and usurp the legitimate democratic will of 
the people and the “progressive life-cycle of acceptance” that occurs in American politics 
through federalism.211 But as Justice Scalia noted in dissent, “[c]onstitutional entitlements do 
not spring into existence because some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on 
certain behavior.”212 “[T]he Constitution was not created to react to the immediacies of the 
shifting political will of a yet unqualified number of jurisdictions.”213 Consequently, this 
difference-splitting reasoning should not be embraced under the guise of tolerance, moderation 
or social temperance.  Lawrence’s motives are admirable, but its method is badly chosen.214 
210 Describing social legislation as state “experimentation” finds its source in Justice Louis D. 
Brandeis’ Lochner Era dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) whereby 
he stated that it was “one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”  Id. at 311. 
211 See generally Lawrence G. Sager, Cool Federalism and the Life-Cycle of Moral Progress, 46 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1385 (2005).  “Although Sager suggests that final recognition of [moral 
progress] may take the form of . . . ‘federal judicial judgment,’. . . the most appropriate solution” 
is the democratic process.  Basiak, supra note 75, at 174.  
212 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
213 Basiak, supra note 75, at 165.  
214 Beyond substantive due process doctrine, Justice Kennedy has also split-the-difference in 
significant criminal procedure and environmental law cases.  In Roper, Justice Kennedy 
recognized that an emerging awareness existed, which condemned the usage of the death penalty 
for individuals convicted of a crime under the age of 18.  Thus, state statutes permitting such 
penalties are now considered to be cruel and unusual and violative of the Eighth Amendment.  In 
Booker v. Hudson, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006), Justice Kennedy casts the decided fifth vote in a case, 
which refused to extend the exclusionary rule to knock-and-announce doctrine.  However, he 
denied Justice Scalia a majority by concurring and limiting any further restriction of the 
exclusionary rule.  Finally, in Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006), the Court was 
asked to decide the scope of authority granted to the Army Corp of Engineers to regulate 
wetlands as “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act.  Justice Kennedy similarly denied 
Justice Scalia by adopting a case-by-case approach, which unsatisfactorily held to a “significant 
nexus” standard. 
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F. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. 
 
The Supreme Court confirmation hearings of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
predictably focused on substantive due process, especially the right to obtain an abortion.215 
Senators concerned with the continued erosion of such rights repeatedly questioned the nominees 
on their respective opinions of Roe and posed hypothetical questions designed to elaborate on 
cryptic and uninformative opening statements.216 Particularly in the case of Chief Justice 
Roberts, the reaction to these difficult and sometimes combative proceedings was masterful.  
Although his opinion on a number of important constitutional issues remained unknown, the 
 
215 See Susan Page, ‘Roe v. Wade’: The divided states of America, USA Today (April 17, 2006), 
available at www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-04-16-abortion-states_x.htm (last visited 
June 21, 2006) (stating that the abortion fight has “focused on nine members of the Supreme 
Court” for three decades); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 532 
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (stating that the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence 
makes it “the object of the sort of organized political pressure that political institutions in a 
democracy ought to receive”); Statement of Senate Judiciary Chairman Arlen Spector, U.S. 
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Judge Samuel Alito's Nomination to the Supreme Court, 
available at, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/09/AR2006010900755.html (stating that the “dominant issue in 
these hearings is the widespread concern about Judge Alito's position on a woman's right to 
choose”); Daniel Henninger, A Day in Court: Scalia Floats and Breyer Rocks, THE WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (April 28, 2006), available at 
www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/dhenninger/?id=110008304 (stating that the nomination 
hearings “are all about the right to abortion, with the rest of the world mere footnotes”). 
216 Chief Justice Roberts opened the confirmation hearings by proclaiming that he had no 
platform and portraying himself as a humble, non-political judge who would interpret the law 
“without fear or favor.”  Charles Babington & Jo Becker, ‘Judges are not Politicians,’ Roberts 
Says, WASHINGTON POST (September 13, 2005), available at, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/12/AR2005091200642.html; 
see also Jack Shafer, How the Court Imitates the World Series: John Roberts’ Winning Baseball 
Analogy, SLATE (September 13, 2005), at 
www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2126241 (analyzing Chief Justice Roberts’ “balls 
and strikes” analogy and referring to his opening statement as “slow as molasses”).  Although 
Chief Justice Roberts’ statements were clever and generally reassuring, they are, in form, 
commonplace to all confirmation hearings and provide no insight into a jurisprudential approach, 
including the role of precedent, history or text in constitutional interpretation.   
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Senate became preoccupied with his self-promoted modesty and was content to confirm him 
with largely bi-partisan support.217 
Since joining the Court, Chief Justice Roberts has lived up to the considerable 
expectations of conservatives and largely debunked the cynical perspective of liberals.  Rather 
than presenting a “bold and ideological”218 approach like Justices Scalia and Thomas by seeking 
reevaluate precedents he believes to be wrongly decided,219 Chief Justice Roberts’ has mimicked 
his judicial hero and former mentor, Henry J. Friendly, a famous and well-respected U.S. Court 
of Appeals Judge for the Second Circuit,220 by taking careful measure of existing case law before 
encroaching on new legal theories.221 As noted by Professor Douglas Kmiec, “Roberts has a 
conservative mind but a diplomat’s nature.  His abiding concern is to keep the court within 
bounds on legal, rather than ideological, grounds.”222 Thus, his “collegial, consensus-building” 
 
217 The United States Senate voted 78 to 22 to confirm, including all 55 Republicans.  United 
States Senate Legislation & Records, available at 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&ses
sion=1&vote=00245  
218 See E.J. Dionne, Jr., The Chief Justice Sets a Standard, WASHINGTON POST A17 (June 20, 
2006). 
219 STONE, supra note 78, at lxx; see, e.g., Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 547 U.S. ___ (2006) 
(urging the Court to revisit past precedents because they find no basis in the Constitution) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 
2686 (stating that he would “revisit” Public Use Clause cases because he believes they are not in 
accordance with the Clause’s original meaning) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Cass R. 
Sunstein, Minimal Appeal, THE NEW REPUBLIC (August 1, 2005), available at 
http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20050801&s=sunstein080105 (calling Justices Scalia and 
Thomas “radical revision[ists]”) (last visited June 15, 2006). 
220 Adam Liptak, Court in Transition: The Judicial Record; In His Opinions, Nominee Favors 
Judicial Caution, New York Times A1 (July 22, 2005). 
221 In fact, during his 2003 confirmation hearing to become a member of the D.C. Circuit, Chief 
Justice Roberts stated that Roe was “the settled law of the land….”  Terry Frieden & Ed Henry, 
Moderates Cast Doubt on Court Stalemate, CNN.com (July 21, 2005), at 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/07/20/scotus.main/index.html (last visited August 28, 
2006).   
222 Kmiec, supra note 22, available at www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-
kmiec8jul08,0,1887126.story?coll=la-news-comment-opinions. 
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approach “has the capacity to draw votes from both sides on controversial and pedestrian cases 
alike.”223 
The earliest and perhaps most poignant example of the Chief Justice’s “consensus-
building” occurred in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, a contentious 
case, which pitted the associational and free speech rights of law schools against the military and 
spending powers of Congress.  Various law schools challenged a statute that denied federal 
funding to those institutions, which had denied equal access to military recruiters on campus 
based on the military’s treatment of homosexuals.224 The District Court denied an application 
for a preliminary injunction, but the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that the statute was an 
unconstitutional condition on the law schools.225 The Supreme Court reversed.226 Remarkably, 
despite the controversial political issues raised by the case, Chief Justice Roberts crafted a 
narrow, but intellectually sound ruling that drew unanimous approval from the other justices.  
Rather than clumsily applying compelled speech case law, he correctly recognized that such 
doctrine was “plainly incidental” because “it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom 
 
223 Id. 
224 Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. at 1302.  The Solomon Amendment denied federal funding to an 
institution, 
if the Secretary of Defense determines that that institution (or any subelement of 
that institution) has a policy or practice (regardless of when implemented) that 
either prohibits, or in effect prevents-- (1) the Secretary of a military department 
or Secretary of Homeland Security from gaining access to campuses, or access to 
students (who are 17 years of age or older) on campuses, for purposes of military 
recruiting in a manner that is at least equal in quality and scope to the access to 
campuses and to students that is provided to any other employer; or (2) access by 
military recruiters for purposes of military recruiting to the following information 
pertaining to students (who are 17 years of age or older) enrolled at that institution 
(or any subelement of that institution): (A) Names, addresses, and telephone 
listings. (B) Date and place of birth, levels of education, academic majors, degrees 
received, and the most recent educational institution enrolled in by the student. 
10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (2005). 
225 Id. at 1304. 
226 Id.
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of speech or press to [regulate] … a course of conduct….”227 This result avoided the temptation 
to convolute doctrine and it preserved a clearly demarcated speech/conduct distinction, implying 
that speech rather than conduct would retain its standing as the most rigorously guarded 
constitutional right.228 Consequently, neither the Court’s liberals nor its conservatives quarreled 
with reasoning or result. 
In the context of substantive due process doctrine, Chief Justice Roberts has thus far 
succeeded in applying his minimalist, consensus-building approach.  In Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood of Northern New England,229 the Court was asked to consider the constitutionality of 
a New Hampshire abortion law, which failed to provide for a health exception for the mother.  
Reasoning that the law explicitly violated the undue burden standard set forth in Casey, the 
District Court entered a preliminary injunction and the First Circuit affirmed.  Rather than 
unnecessarily and prematurely revisiting abortion precedents (given the infancy of his tenure as 
Chief Justice), at oral argument in November 2005, Chief Justice Roberts indicated at oral 
argument that the case could be decided narrowly based on the issue of remedy.230 Writing for a 
unanimous Supreme Court (incidentally, for the first time ever in an abortion case) Justice 
O'Connor reasoned that the District Court could have entered an injunction narrower in scope.  
Therefore, the case was remanded. 
Admittedly, despite Chief Justice Roberts’ first term successes, it important not to 
overstate the significance of the Court’s newfound consensus.  As evident from the holding of 
Ayotte, the Roberts Court has yet to squarely address the issue of abortion, and when it does, the 
Chief Justice will need more than his cautious, minimalist approach and celebrated intellect to 
 
227 Id. at 1308 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)). 
228 See id. at 1309-10. 
229 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 126 S. Ct. 961 (2006). 
230 Summers, supra note 114, at 689. 
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obtain a clear majority.  The moderate and evenhanded approaches of Justice Breyer and Justice 
Kennedy (despite his extravagant language) undoubtedly hold tremendous appeal and they will 
continue to serve as a tempting solution for decisions that create political divisiveness.  Avoiding 
split-the-difference substantive due process jurisprudence in future cases will therefore require 
additional, well-settled doctrinal components. 
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
If split-the-difference substantive due process jurisprudence is to be marginalized and 
uniformity in reasoning sustained, the Roberts Court will have to, at minimum, remain faithful to 
two recent developments.  First, the Supreme Court must continue its extension of the Graham 
doctrine.  Under Graham, substantive due process claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
cannot succeed where a more “explicit textual source of constitutional protection” exists.231 
Thus, for example, when a constitutional claim is brought as a result of a law enforcement 
officer’s excessive force, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard rather than the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s “generalized notion of ‘substantive due process’ must be the guide . . . 
. .”232 At minimum, a faithful adherence to this principle will substantially limit the availability 
of substantive due process claims and avoid opportunity to craft compromised-minded solutions.  
It may even slowly return the Court to the “jot-for-jot” approach of Justice Black.233 
The second, and perhaps more revolutionary, way in which the Roberts Court can limit 
split-the-difference jurisprudence is through the revitalization of the Privileges and Immunities 
 
231 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
232 Id.
233 Massaro, supra note 113, at 1121.  “The logic of Graham requires that substantive due 
process be confined to its current doctrinal limits, at the very least, and, carried to its furthest 
extreme, requires overruling the Court’s substantive due process ‘unenumerated rights’ caselaw 
altogether.”  Id. at 1091.  Whether or not this prediction comes to fruition, the benefit of Graham 
is that both the Court’s liberals and conservatives appear to recognize its validity, and thus, its 
application is likely to continue.  
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Clause.  Even though the Slaughter House Cases liquidated the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause as a source of unenumerated fundamental rights, recent interest from both the Court’s 
liberals and conservatives brings intriguing possibility of new life.234 If this development were 
to persist, less reliance would be placed on the Due Process Clause.  While the dormancy of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause leaves the Court with little constitutional guidance for its 
decisions,235 it would nevertheless create greater legitimacy for the discovery (or subsequent 
demise) of unenumerated fundamental rights and diminish the significant expansion of 
institutional authority afforded to the Supreme Court.236 This increased legitimacy may create a 
greater consensus among the Court’s most sharply divided justices and reduce the temptation to 
split-the-difference in reasoning or result. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton famously assured the People of the State of New 
York that “the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to 
 
234 In Saenz, the Supreme Court, for the first time since Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), 
utilized the Privileges and Immunities Clause to invalidate a state regulation.  Within the context 
of substantive due process doctrine, liberal judges and scholars have, as noted, acknowledged the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause’s enhanced legitimacy for the discovery of unenumerated 
rights.  Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 760 n. 6 (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14-30 (1980)) (acknowledging the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause rather than the Due Process Clause, is the “proper warrant for courts’ substantive 
oversight of state legislation”) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); TRIBE, supra note 84, at 
1328-29 (commenting on the Privileges and Immunities Clause’s “apparent textual and historical 
superiority to the substantive due process method of incorporating and protecting fundamental 
rights”).  Likewise, Justice Thomas appears ready to reconsider the Clause’s meaning.  See 
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 n. 1 (Thomas, concurring in the judgment). 
235 Judge Wilkinson has suggested that the Privileges and Immunities Clause is a “dormant 
volcano” noting that “[n]either the language of the clause nor any judicial interpretations 
provides useful guidance in determining what rights would be fundamental.”  J. Harvie 
Wilkinson, III, The Fourteenth Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause, Harv. J. L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 43, 51 (1989). 
236 The resurrection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause should not of course be a means of 
exhuming Lochner Era economic liberty.  Otherwise it would merely contribute to the current 
state of judicial supremacy.  
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the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure 
them.”237 Thus, as the weakest of the three departments of power,”238 the judiciary, it could 
“truly be said,” would have “neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment[.]”239 Yet, despite 
Hamilton’s pledge, in the wake of the intellectual struggle between Justices Black and Harlan 
and aided by the jurisprudential pragmatism of Justice O’Connor, a split-the-difference 
substantive due process jurisprudence has developed, which inappropriately expands the 
Supreme Court’s judicial discretion.  Under the leadership of Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme 
Court has a unique opportunity to restore its institutional role.  Rather than “interpreting” the 
Constitution in a manner that purports to promote participation in democracy or preempting 
democratic judgment through judicial intervention aimed at political moderation, Chief Justice 
Roberts can and must apply the principles of judicial modesty and intellectual consistency that he 
routinely expressed during his confirmation hearing, and account for the authority of the 
Congress, the executive and the States.  
 
237 THE FEDERALIST NUMBER 78 (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed. at 490) (Hamilton). 
238 Id. at 491 
239 Id. at 490. 
